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CASE NOTE

A THROWBACK TO LESS ENLIGHTENED PRACTICES:
J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. v. NICASTRO

ZACH VOSSELER

†

INTRODUCTION
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines,
Inc., a case arising from an Iowa corporation’s publication of an article
1
about Al Polizzi, an individual living in Coral Gables, Florida. The
article—which referred to Polizzi as “one of the ringleaders of a
national gang of murderous, blackmailing prostitute-pandering crimi2
nals”—was printed in Look magazine and circulated throughout Florida.
3
Affronted by the article, Polizzi demanded the publisher retract it.
When the publisher refused, Polizzi filed a libel suit in the state court
4
in his home county. The Court reversed the lower courts’ grant of a
5
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but more
importantly, it “express[ed] no opinion” as to whether the publisher

†
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1
Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 667 (1953) (Black, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 667-68.
5
Id. at 665 (majority opinion).
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was “doing business” in Florida within the meaning of the require6
ments established eight years prior in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.
Justice Black strongly opposed the Court’s holding. He was incensed that the Court had bypassed the “doing business” question in
7
making its narrow determination. The personal jurisdiction land8
scape had changed greatly since International Shoe, and Justice Black
was concerned that the Court would revert to old practice, as it had
“refused to be bound by old rigid concepts about ‘doing business’”
9
until it decided this case. As he wrote: “Whether cases are to be tried
in one locality or another is now to be tested by basic principles of
fairness, unless, as seems possible, this case represents a throwback to
10
what I consider less enlightened practices.”
While the rationale of International Shoe and its progeny were, as
Justice Burton rightly predicted in his Polizzi opinion, neither “aban11
doned” nor “impaired” after the decision, the personal jurisdiction
doctrine may today be facing a variant of Justice Black’s fears.
After two decades of dormancy, the sleeping giant of personal jurisdiction has finally awakened with the Supreme Court’s opinion in J.
12
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro. However, as in its two most recent
13
personal jurisdiction opinions, the Court was less than univocal. This
Note attempts to understand the reasoning behind J. McIntyre; to determine the status of the second prong of the Court’s (in)famous two14
part test for personal jurisdiction; to analyze J. McIntyre’s effect on
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in the immediate future; and,
6

Id. at 666 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
Id. at 669 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8
See Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1998) (observing that International Shoe represented a “paradigm shift” in
the Court’s jurisprudence).
9
Polizzi, 345 U.S. at 669-70 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
10
Id. at 670.
11
Id. at 672 (Burton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12
131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
13
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality opinion), was decided
in a 4-4-1 ruling, and in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)
(plurality opinion), the minimum contacts issue (which arguably also caused the split
in J. McIntyre) was decided in a 4-4-3 ruling ( Justices White and Blackmun joined both
Justice Brennan’s and Justice Stevens’s concurrences).
14
A defendant must have “certain minimum contacts with . . . [the forum State]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis
added) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The Court’s everchanging opinion of what constitutes fairness and reasonableness, as well as how
much weight should be afforded those considerations (if any at all), provided the
impetus for this Note.
7
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ultimately, to question whether J. McIntyre, too, represents a “throw15
back to . . . less enlightened practices.”
I. THE DOCTRINE: A THEMATIC REVIEW
IN REASONABLE TERMS
Following International Shoe’s firm proclamation that “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice” were a dominant feature of
16
personal jurisdiction analysis, the Supreme Court decided several
17
important cases that advanced this fairness standard. In McGee v.
18
International Life Insurance Co., the “high-water mark of personal ju19
risdiction,” the Court extended the doctrine under “evolving stand20
ards of due process” when it held that the defendant, a Texas
21
insurance company, was amenable to jurisdiction in California.
Justice Black explained that McGee’s holding fit within a “clearly discernible” trend “toward expanding the permissible scope of state juris22
This
diction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents.”
trend was in large part driven by the “increasing nationalization of
commerce” and “modern transportation and communication [that] . . .
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a
23
State where he engages in economic activity.” When the insurance
15

Polizzi, 345 U.S. at 670 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463).
17
Scholars have thoroughly examined the fifteen or so major cases that make up
the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham
and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19 (1990); Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due
Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1,
8-28 (2006); William M. Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
599 (1993). In a departure from the typical recitation of the history of the doctrine,
however, this Note analyzes why the decision to exercise or deny jurisdiction in each
case was the fair and reasonable decision, given that jurisdiction has been defined as a
power to create or affect legal interests based on a “relationship to [a] state . . . such as
to make the exercise of such jurisdiction reasonable.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24(1) (1971). While power and sufficient contacts are important
elements of personal jurisdiction analysis, reasonableness has always been paramount.
See, e.g., id. cmt. b (“One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction. . . . [A] state
does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it.”
(emphasis added)).
18
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
19
Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State
Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 489 (1984).
20
See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 101 (1978) (explaining the
holding in McGee).
21
See McGee, 355 U.S. at 224.
22
Id. at 222.
23
Id. at 223.
16
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company actively sought to reinsure the plaintiff, and mailed a contract to the plaintiff’s home in California, it should reasonably have
expected to be sued in California on a cause of action arising from that
24
contract. Justice Black’s invocation of the expanding scope of state
jurisdiction signaled an expansion in the Court’s view of the circumstances under which the exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable.
In the years following McGee, the Court continued to push back on
the notion of territorial sovereignty that the minimum contacts test
seemed to champion, in favor of a more reasonable and equitable
25
approach. In Kulko v. Superior Court of California —a child custody
dispute filed by a California plaintiff-mother against a New York
defendant-father—the Court stated that, like any standard requiring a
determination of reasonableness, “the ‘minimum contacts’ test of
26
InInternational Shoe is not susceptible of mechanical application.”
27
stead, the test requires a case-specific weighing of facts. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, held that “the circumstances in this case
clearly render[ed] ‘unreasonable’ California’s assertion of personal
28
jurisdiction” and supported that conclusion by “appeal[ing] to communi-tarian values—objective, public concerns for fairness and rea29
sonableness.” In Kulko, the Court began to question the notion of
territorial sovereignty implicit in the minimum contacts test,
advocating a more reasonable and equitable approach and invoking
30
what the Court termed “basic considerations of fairness.” According
to Justice Marshall, these fairness considerations pointed “decisively in
favor of [New York] as the proper forum for adjudication of this case,
24

Id.
436 U.S. 84 (1990). In Kulko, two New York domiciliaries married in California
during a three-day stopover while the husband was en route to military duty overseas.
Mrs. Kulko returned to New York, and she was joined by Mr. Kulko at the conclusion of
his tour of duty, whereupon they had two children. The couple separated in 1972, and
Mrs. Kulko moved to California. Later, Mr. Kulko sent their daughter (at her request)
to live with her mother. Two years later, their son went to join his mother in California
without Mr. Kulko’s consent. Mrs. Kulko then brought an action in California against
her ex-husband seeking, inter alia, full custody of her children. Mr. Kulko made a special appearance, claiming he lacked minimum contacts with California to warrant its
assertion of personal jurisdiction over him. Id. at 86-88.
26
Id. at 92.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 96. Justice Marshall specifically refuted the plaintiff’s reference to McGee,
writing that the defendant’s activities “cannot fairly be analogized to an insurer’s
sending an insurance contract and premium notices into the State to an insured
resdent of the State.” Id. at 96.
29
Richard K. Greenstein, The Nature of Legal Argument: The Personal Jurisdiction Paradigm, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 855, 869 (1986).
30
Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97.
25
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whatever the merits of [the mother’s] underlying claim.”
The
defendant had merely acquiesced to his daughter’s desire to live in
California with her mother, and this single act “surely” could not be
considered “one that a reasonable parent would expect to result in the
substantial financial burden and personal strain of litigating a child32
support suit in a forum 3,000 miles away.” The Court thus found no
basis for the claim that the defendant could reasonably have anticipated
33
being haled before a court in California.
Two years later, the Court took these nascent beginnings of a
reasonableness test, and endeavored to provide more concrete guidance for courts attempting to apply the “traditional notions of fair play
34
and substantial justice” in the future. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, the Court refused to allow a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation when the only connection
between the corporation and the forum was a single product sold in
the corporation’s home state that proved defective in the forum
35
state. Looking to reasonableness, the Court adumbrated several factors for courts to consider, including
the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute . . . ; the plaintiffs
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief . . . at least when that
interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiffs power to choose the
forum . . . ; the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the sever36
al States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.

However, because the Court found that Oklahoma failed the minimum contacts test, the Court chose not to apply these factors to the

31

Id.
Id.
33
See id. at 97-98; see also Greenstein, supra note 29, at 870 (discussing the Court’s
references to the “nationalization of commerce” and to “modern transportation and
communication” from McGee in order to distinguish this family law dispute “from the
kind of commercial activity in which the significance of state borders diminishes”).
34
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
35
See 444 U.S. 286, 296-98 (1980) (explaining that the unilateral activity of a consumer taking a company’s product into a distant forum is not sufficient to render the
company subject to jurisdiction in that forum). World-Wide Volkswagen was the first case
to address the issue of corporations injecting into the “stream of commerce” products
that subsequently injure consumers in the forum state—the plaintiff had purchased a
car in New York from a New York corporation and unilaterally brought it to Oklahoma.
See id. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the novelty of the majority’s reasoning in finding that Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction).
36
Id. at 292 (majority opinion).
32
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37

particular facts of the case. Had it done so, the Court most likely
would have regarded the exercise of jurisdiction over a small upstate
New York car dealership and its regional distributor in regard to an
accident that occurred in Oklahoma as unreasonable.
Though the Court discussed the relationship between these new
“fair play and substantial justice” factors and minimum contacts in
38
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the Court finally applied the factors in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California when eight Justices
agreed that California’s attempt to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign
39
First, the
corporation violated “fair play and substantial justice.”
burden on the defendant was tremendous given the distance between
Japan and California and the differences in both language and legal
40
systems. Second, although the underlying accident occurred in California, the State had no real interest in the outcome of the ultimately
litigated dispute: whether a Japanese parts manufacturer had to in41
Finally, there was no need to
demnify a Taiwanese company.
consider the plaintiffs’ interest in the case, as the plaintiff in the original accident (who was not a California resident) had settled and was
42
no longer a party to the suit. With these factors in mind, the Court
43
held that the suit did not belong in California.

37

Justice Brennan did apply some of the standards to the facts of the case in his
dissent. See id. at 300-01, 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38
417 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (holding that minimum contacts “may be considered
in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction
would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice’” (quoting International Shoe,
326 U.S. at 320)).
39
See 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (plurality opinion). By the time this case reached
the Supreme Court, all that remained of the initial products liability action was a dispute between a Taiwanese tire manufacturer (Cheng Shin) and a Japanese valve assembly manufacturer (Asahi) against whom Cheng Shin had cross-claimed, seeking
indemnification. Asahi, who had shipped its valves to only Cheng Shin in Taiwan,
moved to quash the summons, claiming that California did not have personal
jurisdiction over it. Id. at 105-08.
40
See id. at 114 (“The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself
in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness
of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.”)
41
See id. (reasoning that with only foreign parties left in the suit, California’s interest in the case was “considerably diminished”).
42
See id.
43
Id. at 116.
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II. THE CASE: NEITHER FAIRLY PLAYED
NOR SUBSTANTIALLY JUST
Looking through the lens of reasonableness and fairness, we can
now critique J. McIntyre in an effort to discern why six members of the
Court decided to subsume the “fair play and substantial justice” prong
of the personal jurisdiction test under the minimum contacts prong
44
when the former had previously functioned as an independent and essen45
tial part of the analysis.
A. Background
Robert Nicastro, an employee of Curcio Scrap Metal in Saddle
Brook, New Jersey, was operating a recycling machine used to cut
metal when his right hand was accidentally caught in the machine’s
46
blades, severing four of his fingers.
The machine, the McIntyre
Model 640 Shear, was manufactured by J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.
(J. McIntyre or J. McIntyre Machinery), a company incorporated in
47
the United Kingdom. The machine had been sold to Curcio Scrap
Metal through J. McIntyre’s exclusive United States distributor,

44

See Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 509-10 (1987) (asserting that
the Court in Asahi did treat the minimum contacts and reasonableness “as distinct
elements, with both necessary in order to support jurisdiction”).
45
To be clear, this Note makes no claim either that the Court should absolutely
have upheld personal jurisdiction purely on the basis of the fairness standard, or that
fairness should take precedence over minimum contacts. Instead, this Note acknowledges that personal jurisdiction had developed into a two-prong standard and argues
that it should have remained that way. The Asahi Court felt it necessary to engage in a
minimum contacts analysis even though eight members of the Court agreed that the
result of the Court’s fairness analysis was sufficient to keep the case out of California.
See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“An examination of minimum contacts is not always necessary to determine
whether a state court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional.”). The reverse should have been true in J. McIntyre—the fairness factors deserved at least some
examination, but they were ignored. Cf. Richard D. Freer, Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, Justice Brennan’s Jurisdictional Jurisprudence: Did
He Really Have it His Way?, Speech at the South Carolina Law Review Symposium:
Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century: The Implications of McIntyre
and Goodyear Dunlop Tires (Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://video.sc.edu/law/
lawrev4brennan.mov, at 9:34 (stating that Justice Brennan’s opinion in Burger King
“c[ame] very close to guaranteeing that fairness factors will always be on the table”).
46
See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010) (providing information on the underlying facts of the case), rev’d, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
47
Id.
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48

McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd. (McIntyre America).
Nicastro
filed a products liability action against both J. McIntyre and McIntyre
America, claiming that the Model 640 Shear “failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions” and that it was lacking a safety guard
49
that would have prevented the accident.
Before the accident, Robert Curcio, the owner of Curcio Scrap
Metal, attended an Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries convention
50
in Las Vegas. During the convention, he visited McIntyre America’s
51
booth and was introduced to the Model 640 Shear. He purchased
the machine from McIntyre America for $24,900 and it was shipped to
52
Curcio from McIntyre America’s headquarters in Ohio. Although
the check was payable to “McIntyre Machinery of America, Inc.,” the
Model 640 Shear was affixed with a label stating J. McIntyre Machin53
ery’s name and United Kingdom address.
It was unclear which company was responsible for J. McIntyre
products reaching American hands. Although J. McIntyre and McIntyre America were distinct corporate entities, McIntyre America “structured its advertising and sales efforts in accordance with J. McIntyre’s
54
direction and guidance whenever possible.” Furthermore, J. McIntyre may have retained ownership of the machines it sent to McIntyre
America, evidenced by a letter from J. McIntyre’s president to McIntyre America, which stated, “Please note that th[e] machines are our
55
property until they have been paid for in full.” The president of J.
McIntyre Machinery had attended the convention in Las Vegas, and
other officials from J. McIntyre had attended conventions and similar
events in Chicago, New Orleans, Orlando, San Diego, and San Fran56
cisco, among other cities. Despite the presence of J. McIntyre officials, however, McIntyre America fielded all requests for information
57
about J. McIntyre’s products at these events.
The New Jersey trial court granted J. McIntyre’s motion to dismiss,
58
stating that J. McIntyre had “no contacts” with the state. The Appellate
48

Id.
Id. at 578.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 579.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). McIntyre America never participated
in the lawsuit. The company filed for bankruptcy in 2001. Id. at 578 n.2.
49
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Division reversed, holding that New Jersey’s exercise of personal jurisdiction “would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substan59
tial justice.” The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed that decision,
holding that a foreign manufacturer that places a product in the
stream of commerce “through a distribution scheme that targets a national market, which includes New Jersey” should be subject to per60
sonal jurisdiction in New Jersey. Subsequently, J. McIntyre appealed
61
to the Supreme Court. The Court reversed the judgment of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in a 4-2-3 decision, holding that New Jersey
62
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over J. McIntyre.
B. Justice Kennedy’s Plurality Opinion
Patrick Borchers describes Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion as
“quite possibly the most poorly reasoned and obtuse decision of the
63
entire minimum contacts era.” Whether Professor Borchers is correct or not, J. McIntyre does represent a “throwback to . . . less enlight64
65
ened practices” —a retreat to a Pennoyer v. Neff--esque jurisprudence
of territorial sovereignty. In J. McIntyre, Justice Kennedy purported to
66
answer the “decades-old questions left open in Asahi” —questions
that had arisen only because none of the writing Justices in Asahi
could command a majority, thereby leaving the stream-of-commerce
67
theory broken and forcing the lower courts to pick up the pieces. However, his opinion appears to have abandoned considerations of reasonableness, which is the core of post-Pennoyer personal jurisdiction theory.
Attempting to do away with fairness and reasonableness considerations, Justice Kennedy wrote, “Freeform notions of fundamental fairness divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment

59

Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 945 A.2d 92, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2008).
60
McIntyre America, 987 A.2d at 589.
61
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010) (granting certiorari).
62
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (plurality opinion).
63
Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the
Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1263 (2011). Professor Borchers
goes on to state that the plurality’s “saving grace, if one can call it that, is that it attracted only four votes.” Id.
64
Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 670 (1953) (Black, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
65
95 U.S. 714 (1878), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
66
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2785.
67
See Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 587-88 nn.10-12 (N.J.
2010) (surveying the landscape of various courts’ responses to the Asahi opinions).
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68

rendered in the absence of authority into law.” In the place of fairness and reasonableness analysis, Justice Kennedy described the
“general rule” of a sovereign’s exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant as requiring “some act by which the defendant ‘purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
69
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” Justice Kennedy added that “in some cases . . . the defendant
might . . . fall within the State’s authority by reason of his attempt to ob70
struct its laws.” Applying this general rule, Justice Kennedy found that
New Jersey should not be permitted to exercise jurisdiction over
71
J. McIntyre Machinery.
Allan Ides portrays Justice Kennedy’s discussion of obstruction of
72
the laws as a version of the Calder v. Jones effects test, in that it describes a condition sufficient for exercising jurisdiction when an outof-state defendant causes an obstruction of the law in the forum
73
state. If Professor Ides is correct, Justice Kennedy’s opinion merely
raises the question: How is J. McIntyre Machinery not obstructing the
laws of New Jersey, or of the United States as a whole, by sending
74
products into its jurisdiction but evading its courts? Though this is
not an intentional tort case, which the Court in Calder confronted
when creating the effects test, the New Jersey Supreme Court believed
that the “preeminent issue” in this case was whether it would “read the
Due Process Clause in a way that renders a state powerless to provide
relief to a resident who suffers injuries from a product that was sold
and marketed by a manufacturer, through an independent distributor, knowing that the final destination might be a New Jersey consum75
er.” The New Jersey court also believed important policy considerations
supported its exercise of jurisdiction, including the state’s compelling
and “paramount interest in ensuring a forum for its injured citizens
who have suffered catastrophic injuries due to allegedly defective
68

J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787.
Id. at 2787 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
70
Id. at 2787
71
Id. at 2791.
72
465 U.S. 783 (1984).
73
Allan Ides, Foreword: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 359 n.82 (2012).
74
See Borchers, supra note 63, at 1265 (hypothesizing that even Ohio, the location
of the U.S. distributor, would fail the plurality’s targeting test, because Ohio was “merely a way station for machines destined for other states,” which would result “in the bizarre conclusion that a foreign distributor, intentionally exploiting the U.S. market (even
on the plurality’s account), is nonetheless not amenable to jurisdiction in any state.”).
75
Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 590 (N.J. 2010).
69
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76

products in the workplace.” The New Jersey court acknowledged
that it would be “strange indeed” if a New Jersey manufacturer of a
defective product—which would clearly be subject to the jurisdiction
of New Jersey’s courts—could relocate its operation to a foreign country, sell its products through an exclusive independent distributor to
New Jersey consumers, and by virtue of its relocation “suddenly become beyond the reach of one of our injured citizens through this
77
State’s legal system.” Although J. McIntyre was never based in New
Jersey, this hypothetical exposes the Supreme Court’s strange logic
and the unfairness of the plurality’s opinion.
Later in his opinion, Justice Kennedy characterized Justice Brennan’s Asahi concurrence—which allegedly “discarded the central con78
cept of sovereign authority” in order to “advocat[e] a rule based on
general notions of fairness and foreseeability”—as being “inconsistent
79
with the premises of lawful judicial power.”
According to Justice
Kennedy, this conclusion was supported by the fact that the Court in
Burnham v. Superior Court of California “‘conducted no independent inquiry into the desirability or fairness’ of the rule that service of process
within a State suffices to establish jurisdiction over an otherwise for80
eign defendant.” It should be noted, however, that five of the nine
Justices in Burnham, including Justice Brennan, did discuss the fairness
of the decision. Justice Brennan stated that unlike the plurality, he
81
“would undertake an ‘independent inquiry into the . . . fairness,’” and
Justice Stevens stated that the “considerations of fairness identified by
82
Justice Brennan” demonstrated that Burnham was “a very easy case.”
In J. McIntyre, Justice Kennedy sought to demonstrate the undesirability of Justice Brennan’s stream-of-commerce theory by describing
83
the hypothetical plight of a small-time Florida farmer. In this hypothetical, the small-time farmer sells crops to a distributor who then
84
sells those same crops to supermarkets across the country. “If foreseeability were the controlling criterion,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “the

76

See id. at 590 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985)).
Id. at 591.
78
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (plurality opinion).
79
Id. at 2789.
80
Id. (quoting Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990) (plurality opinion)).
81
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis
added) (quoting id. at 621 (plurality opinion)).
82
Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
83
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (plurality opinion).
84
Id.
77
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farmer could be sued in Alaska or any number of other States’ courts
85
without ever leaving town.”
In constructing this hypothetical, Justice Kennedy ignores the reasoning of World-Wide Volkswagen that if the risks of litigation in a particular state are too great, a corporation (or small-time farmer) can
86
alleviate the risk of adverse litigation by severing ties with that forum.
If the farmer was worried about litigation in Alaska, and was aware that
the distributor sent its crops to Alaska, he could stop doing business
with the distributor or dictate to the distributor the states to which his
87
By basing jurisdiction on contacts
products should be shipped.
88
alone, Justice Kennedy creates a line of reasoning that would seem to
rule out not only Alaska, but also Georgia and Alabama as possible
89
fora for plaintiffs seeking redress against the farmer. But if Justice
Kennedy had simply based jurisdiction on the fairness analysis discussed in World-Wide Volkswagen and other cases—and made binding in
Asahi—the Alaska court could reasonably reject jurisdiction as simply
unfair. The burden on a small-time Florida defendant litigating in
Alaska would be immense and would be a substantial consideration

85

Id.
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (explaining how companies might deal with the likelihood of burdensome litigation
under the “purposeful availment” test).
87
See Linda Sandstrom Simard, Meeting Expectations: Two Profiles for Specific Jurisdiction, 38 IND. L. REV. 343, 374 (2005) (“A defendant exercises control over its jurisdictional exposure at the time that it decides whether to reach out to a forum state. It is
at this time that the defendant must consider whether the ‘benefit’ of the contact is
worth the ‘burden’ of answering to potential claims in the jurisdiction.”).
88
See Freer, supra note 45, at 19:50-21:00 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s reasoning as
“putting all the eggs in the contacts basket”).
89
See Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and
McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 234 (2011) (suggesting that Justice Kennedy
would allow the denial of jurisdiction for a Manhattan manufacturer who shipped a
product to Jersey City—a distance of 9.6 miles); cf. Weintraub, supra note 19, at 502
(“[T]he reasoning of [World-Wide Volkswagen] would have led to the same result if the
Audi had been rear-ended and the suit had been brought in Pennsylvania, just across
the state line from a courthouse in New York in which the regional distributor was in
litigation.”). It is worth noting that there is no explicit basis for the inverse of WorldWide Volkswagen’s holding—i.e., that reasonableness would mandate jurisdiction in a
closer forum—in the Court’s jurisprudence. However, the notion was implied by
Justice Brennan in Burger King. See James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of
Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 253 n.318 (2004)
(addressing Justice Brennan’s implication that a lack of a burden on a defendant could
be a factor that would support jurisdiction).
86
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in determining whether Alaska should exercise jurisdiction under
90
the fairness standard.
Not only does Justice Kennedy ignore World-Wide Volkswagen’s reasonableness rationale, he appears to rely on aspects of that decision
that were later affirmatively repudiated by the Court. Justice White,
writing for the majority in World-Wide Volkswagen, attempted to battle
against what he viewed as a “substantial[] relax[ation]” of Due Process
limitations on personal jurisdiction by adhering to territorial sover91
eignty as a source of authority. “The sovereignty of each state,” he
wrote, “implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister
States—a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of
92
the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.” However, this
93
mandate was “short-lived.” Only two years after arguing that interstate federalism was an additional source of personal jurisdiction
authority, Justice White retreated from his World-Wide Volkswagen posi94
tion—perhaps in response to academic criticism —in Insurance Corp.
95
of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee. In a footnote to that
opinion, he wrote that the invocation of federalism in World-Wide
Volkswagen “must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause [which is] the only
96
source of the personal jurisdiction requirement.” The Court later con97
firmed Insurance Corp. of Ireland’s rejection of the sovereignty rationale.
90

See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985) (“[M]inimum
requirements inherent in the concept of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ may defeat
the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in
forum activities.” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. (plurality opinion) at 292));
see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (denying
jurisdiction on reasonableness grounds).
91
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292-93. According to Justice White, if reasonableness factors weigh against a finding of jurisdiction, it is only because the Due Process Clause has acted “as an instrument of interstate federalism” in divesting a
sovereign of its power to render a valid judgment. Id. at 294.
92
Id. at 293.
93
Weinstein, supra note 89, at 212.
94
For arguably the harshest critique of Justice White’s rationale, see Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U.
L. REV. 1112 (1981). See also Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” or “Totality of the Circumstances”? It’s Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction Standard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 79 n.163 (2004) (“The difficulty of justifying the
use of sovereignty factors had been recognized for a long time, but the Redish article
made the objection too powerful to be ignored any longer.”).
95
456 U.S. 694 (1982).
96
Id. at 702 n.10.
97
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (“[W]e explained
[in Insurance Corp. of Ireland] that the requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction . . . represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a
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Despite this rejection, and despite his acknowledgement that
“[p]ersonal jurisdiction, of course, restricts ‘judicial power not as a
matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of liberty,’” Justice Kennedy
maintains that sovereignty is the single determinant of a judgment’s
98
lawfulness. He argues that, because of the “unique genius of our
Constitution,” it is possible that an individual or entity could be subject
to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not of the
99
courts of any particular state. Justice Kennedy posits that the balance
of power between states requires that a state not unlawfully intrude
100
upon the sovereignty of another state, but he offers no example of a
state sovereignty that would be unlawfully intruded upon should New
101
Jersey exercise jurisdiction over this matter.
As a final note, Justice Kennedy offers no guidance as to how Robert
Nicastro would be able to pursue his suit in any forum. He suggests
that perhaps Congress would legislate on the issue to authorize juris102
diction in “appropriate courts.” But the meaning of that term is unclear, and regardless, how likely is it that Congress will take action on
103
behalf of Mr. Nicastro? Justice Kennedy’s opinion posits that, short
of traveling to the United Kingdom, Nicastro will be unable to recover
104
for his injuries.
C. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence in the judgment joined by Justice Alito, states that the Court has never found that a “single isolated
sale,” and indeed even a sale accompanied by a sales effort of J. McIn105
tyre Machinery’s caliber, is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
matter of personal liberty.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Parrish, supra note 17, at 14 (arguing that any doubt that personal jurisdiction has
a basis in sovereign authority was “eradicated” by the Court in Insurance Corp. of Ireland).
98
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (plurality opinion)
(quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
See id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, among States of the United
States, the State in which the injury occurred would seem most suitable for litigation of
a products liability tort claim.”).
102
Id. at 2790 (plurality opinion).
103
Cf. Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV.
85, 137 (1983) (“The fact that Congress has singled out certain classes of cases for extended service [of process], while leaving the balance to be governed by state long-arm
statutes, again weakens the argument for enlarging jurisdiction by federal common law.”).
104
See Richman, supra note 17, at 602 n.19 (“When the plaintiff’s alternative forum
is another country, rather than another state, a jurisdictional dismissal is often fatal.”).
105
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Citing only World-Wide Volkswagen, he wrote, “The Court has held that
a single sale to a customer who takes an accident-causing product to a
different State (where the accident takes place) is not a sufficient basis
106
for asserting jurisdiction.”
But this proposition is incorrect. Unlike World-Wide Volkswagen, the
metal shearing machine was not sold in another state and taken, “uni107
108
lateral[ly],” to the forum where it caused injury to the plaintiff.
This machine was delivered—quite possibly directly from J. McIntyre
109
Machinery itself —to New Jersey, the state where it caused the inju110
ry. Furthermore, J. McIntyre is not the small-time upstate New York
111
dealership suddenly subject to a products liability suit in Oklahoma.
Yet, one could infer from Justice Breyer’s opinion that he finds J.
McIntyre Machinery and the New York dealership in World-Wide
112
Volkswagen to be indistinguishable. First, let us not forget the Court’s
words in World-Wide Volkswagen—a case Justice Breyer is all too eager
to compare to J. McIntyre—that where the sale of a product arises from
a manufacturer’s efforts to sell its product in several states, “it is not
unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly
defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner
113
Second, unlike the dealership in World-Wide Volkswagen,
or others.”
J. McIntyre Machinery is a well-established manufacturer of scrap
106

Id.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
108
In World-Wide Volkswagen the plaintiff brought the car from New York to Oklahoma. See Ides, supra note 73, at 372 (describing Justice Breyer’s retelling of the
Court’s holding in World-Wide Volkswagen as “descriptively accurate, but . . . somewhat
misleading in the present context, [as t]he holding in World-Wide Volkswagen instead
turned on how the product reached the forum state,” not the fact that it was sold there
(emphasis added)).
109
Scholars have questioned the path the metal shearing machine took to reach
New Jersey. See Alan B. Morrison, The Impacts of McIntyre on Minimum Contacts, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1, 3 (2011), http://groups.law.gwu.edu/LR/ArticlePDF/
Morrison_SME_Arguendo.pdf (suggesting that it would have been more practical for J.
McIntyre Machinery to ship the machine directly to New Jersey rather than to McIntyre
America in Ohio to then be shipped to New Jersey).
110
See Pamela J. Stephens, Sovereignty and Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: Up the Stream
of Commerce Without a Paddle, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105, 109-10 (1991) (discussing how,
in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court “left the lower courts . . . to grapple with the distinction . . . apparently made between goods which are brought into a state by consumers and cause injury and goods which are sent into the state by a manufacturer or
distributor, purchased there by a ‘consumer,’ and then cause injury”).
111
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288.
112
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2792 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
113
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
107
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metal shearing machines that chose to employ an exclusive distribution
114
system “with the express goal of exploiting the entire U.S. market.”
Later in his opinion, Justice Breyer offers his own hypothetical:
What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer which specifically seeks, or expects, an equal-sized distributor to sell its product in a
distant State might seem unfair in the case of a small manufacturer (say,
an Appalachian potter) who sells his product (cups and saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, who resells a single item (a coffee mug) to a
buyer from a distant state (Hawaii).115

Professor Ides lambasts Justice Breyer for using this hypothetical to
116
avoid confronting the issues present in this case.
He argues that
while Justice Breyer “worries” about the harm and inconvenience that
could befall potential defendants under such a broad jurisdictional
regime, he has “no parallel concern” for any consumers who would be
injured by his imaginary defendants’ products sold into the U.S. mar117
Regardless of the implications of the comparison between J.
ket.
McIntyre Machinery and the Appalachian potter, Justice Breyer’s hypothetical case could, just as Justice Kennedy’s, be disposed of easily,
118
But by framing the case in this way, Justice
reasonably, and fairly.
Breyer, like Justice Kennedy, has essentially (and unnecessarily) ruled
119
out allowing jurisdiction in a closer forum.
Now, if one were to take a page out of the Kennedy-Breyer playbook and compare J. McIntyre Machinery to any of the past personal
jurisdiction defendants (real or hypothetical), the corporation is
much more akin to the Court’s characterization of the defendants in
Burger King—savvy businessmen who were aware of the nature of the
120
franchising business and knew how to negotiate a contract —than
anyone else. There seem to be two defendant archetypes: the “Appalachian potter”–type and the “experienced and sophisticated businessman”–type. It is well within the “traditional notions of fair play
121
and substantial justice” to consider subjecting one of these types of
defendants to jurisdiction, and not the other. Identifying whether a

114

Ides, supra note 73, at 379.
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
116
Ides, supra note 73, at 379.
117
Id. at 379 n.147.
118
See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
119
See Freer, supra note 45, at 20:00.
120
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479-80, 484 (1985) (discussing
the “sophisticated” franchisees’ “deliberate” choice to negotiate the franchise agreement).
121
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
115
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defendant is one type or the other in personal jurisdiction cases
should be fairly straightforward.
D. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, who “has been quoted more than once as saying
that she would write the opinions for all the procedure cases that
122
come before the Court if only her colleagues would let her,” was only
able to garner the votes of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan in her dissent.
According to Justice Ginsburg, “the splintered majority . . . ‘turn[ed] the
clock back to the days before modern long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a user is injured, need
only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent dis123
tributors market it.’”
Justice Ginsburg, though not specifically mentioning the fair play
and substantial justice analysis from World-Wide Volkswagen, Burger King,
and Asahi, argued that holding J. McIntyre Machinery amenable to
suit in New Jersey would be both fair and reasonable under the cir124
She attacked the plurality’s adherence to sovereignty
cumstances.
first by invoking Shaffer v. Heitner, which stated that, in thencontemporary personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, “the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States [is not] . . . the central concern of the
125
She also maintained that the
inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”
Court had already clarified that the Due Process Clause, which contains no mention of federalism or state sovereignty concerns, is the
126
only constitutional source of the personal jurisdiction requirement.
Justice Ginsburg argued that the modern approach to jurisdiction,
beginning with International Shoe, “gave prime place to reason and
127
With that primacy in mind, she reasoned that convenfairness.”
ience and choice-of-law considerations “point in th[e] direction” of
128
“On
requiring the burden to be placed on J. McIntyre Machinery.
122

Tobias Barrington Wolff, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sensible Pragmatism in Federal
Jurisdictional Policy, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 839, 840 (2009).
123
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2795 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 555 (1995)).
124
Id. at 2804.
125
433 U.S. 186, 204 & n.20 (1977).
126
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
127
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
128
Id.; see also Freer, supra note 45, at 22:40 (relating Justice Ginsburg’s discussion
of various reasonableness factors to Justice Black’s approach in McGee).
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what measure of reason and fairness,” she asked, “can it be considered
undue to require [J.] McIntyre [Machinery] to defend in New Jersey
as an incident of its efforts to develop a market for its industrial ma129
Justice
chines anywhere and everywhere in the United States?”
Ginsburg subscribed to the theory, rejected by the plurality, that the
130
United States be considered a single national market. When a party
has purposefully availed itself of the benefits in that single market, any
state can hale that party into its courts.
The requirement of purposeful availment “ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’
131
‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.” Justice Ginsberg was not concerned with specific state markets, emphasizing instead that the company’s products were sold somewhere in the United States. Because J.
McIntyre itself (through its exclusive distributor) targeted the United
States as a whole, states within the United States should be able to exercise jurisdiction over J. McIntyre. Further, when J. McIntyre sold the
offending machine to a consumer in New Jersey, its affiliation with the
forum—which is the determinative issue in specific jurisdiction cas132
es—could not be called “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated.”
Justice Ginsburg urged that the burden be placed on the distributor to defend in New Jersey because defending in such a forum is a
“reasonable cost of transacting business internationally,” compared to
the burden on Robert Nicastro to travel to England to recover for his
133
“[I]t would undermine principles of fundamental fairness
injuries.
to insulate the foreign manufacturer from accountability in court at
the place within the United States where the manufacturer’s products
134
caused injury.” And yet that is just what the plurality did.

129

Id.
See id. at 2801 (concluding that McIntyre “purposefully availed itself of the
United States market nationwide, not a market in a single State or a discrete collection
of States” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay
Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 805 (1987) (noting that, after Asahi, some lower courts
have found a minimum contacts analysis satisfied by “allowing consideration of the defendant’s contacts with the nation as a whole, rather than simply those with the forum”).
131
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
132
Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475).
133
Id.; see also supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
134
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg
cites several cases in support of this proposition, in which “an alien or out-of-state corporation . . . through a distributor, targeted a national market, including any and all
States” and jurisdiction over that entity was maintained). Id. at 2804.
130
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III. THE AFTERMATH: STICKING TO
THE STATUS QUO?
After waiting over two decades for clearer guidance on personal
jurisdiction cases, lower courts have once again been tasked with the
interpretation of a Supreme Court plurality opinion. Without binding
authority from above, it is not surprising that, in the wake of J. McIntyre, few courts have changed their personal jurisdiction framework.
Most courts have either explicitly stated that J. McIntyre has changed
135
nothing or have sub silentio continued to use their pre–J. McIntyre
136
tests for personal jurisdiction. Such a division in lower courts leads
not only to uncertainty in the law and “undesirable” forum shop137
ping, but also engenders a system in which litigants’ right to access
the courts is determined on a court-by-court basis. The confusion
caused by the Court’s abandonment of a reasonableness and fairness
138
standard is evident in the Cargotec cases, a pair of post–J. McIntyre
cases whose facts bear a striking resemblance to their predecessor.
The Cargotec cases involve forklifts designed and manufactured by
Moffett Engineering, Ltd., an Irish corporation with its principal place
139
of business in Dundalk, Ireland. In both cases, the company claimed
140
no direct connection with the forum state. The company has no employees or agents stationed in the forum states, it never ships products
directly to those states, and it never directly solicited business from
141
companies located in those states.

135

See, e.g., Windsor v. Spinner Indus. Co., No. 10-0114, 2011 WL 5005199, at *4
(D. Md. Oct. 20, 2011) (considering J. McIntyre in detail and concluding that the case
generally “affirms the status quo”).
136
See, e.g., Adelson v. Hananel, 652 F.3d 75, 80-84 (1st Cir. 2011) (applying the
same test the First Circuit used prior to J. McIntyre); Furminator, Inc. v. Wahba, No. 101941, 2011 WL 3847390, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 29, 2011) (applying previously existing
Circuit precedent). In fact, now more than ever, “the courts are rediscovering that
plurality opinions do not mean that much.” Gary A. Magnarini, Jurisdiction Over Foreign-Nation Manufacturers: Tracking the Resurgent “Stream of Commerce” Theory, 68 FLA. B.J.
38, 40 (March 1994).
137
Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain’t the Texas Two Step Folks: Disharmony, Confusion,
and the Unfair Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fifth Circuit, 37 CAP. U. L. REV.
681, 682 (2009).
138
The individual cases are Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 10-0236, 2011 WL
4443626 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 23, 2011), and Lindsey v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 09-0071, 2011
WL 4587583 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 30, 2011).
139
Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *1; Ainsworth, 2011 WL 4443626, at *1.
140
Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *1; Ainsworth, 2011 WL 4443626, at *1.
141
Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *1; Ainsworth, 2011 WL 4443626, at *1.
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Moffett sells all of its products to Cargotec USA, Inc., which, in turn,
142
markets and sells Moffett’s products throughout the United States.
Under a contract between the two companies, Cargotec has the “ex143
The contract
clusive right” to market and sell Moffett’s products.
defines Cargotec’s sales territory as the “United States,” and Cargotec
144
Moffett does
markets and sells Moffett products in all fifty states.
not direct and has no knowledge of Cargotec’s sales activity; it does
145
not communicate with the retail purchasers of its products. According to the evidence submitted, “Moffett remains wholly unaware of
146
who the purchaser is or where they are located.” Despite its alleged
ignorance of Cargotec’s activities, Moffett products have sold well in
the United States; since the year 2000, Moffett has sold 13,073 forklifts
147
148
to Cargotec, and the value of these forklifts exceeds $460 million.
In Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., a Mississippi resident was struck
149
and killed by one of Moffett’s forklifts.
The U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Mississippi had previously denied Moffett’s
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but Moffett filed a
150
motion for reconsideration in the wake of J. McIntyre. In response to
Moffett’s motion for reconsideration, the district judge stated that because Justice Breyer did not choose between the Asahi opinions,151 and
because he did not reject the notion that “mere foreseeability or awareness is a constitutionally sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction if the
defendant’s product made its way into the forum state while still in the

142

Ainsworth, 2011 WL 4443626, at *1.
Id.; see also Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *8 (“Cargotec has the exclusive right to
market and sell Moffett’s products in the United States.”).
144
Ainsworth, 2011 WL 4443626, at *1.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
The opinion cited an amount of 254 million Euro. Id. at *1. The figure above
was calculated using the exchange rate the judge utilized later in the opinion. See id. at
*7 (calculating the likely value of the sales in American currency).
149
Id. at *1.
150
See id. at *2.
151
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (O'Connor, J.) (stating that without “[a]dditional conduct,” “a defendant's
awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum
State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream of
commerce into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.”); see also id. at
117 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“As long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility
of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”)
143
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152

stream of commerce,” J. McIntyre “is rather limited in its applicabil153
Justice Breyer’s opinion did not provide the district court with
ity.”
any grounds to depart from binding Fifth Circuit precedent, which
had “establish[ed] Justice Brennan’s Asahi opinion as the controlling
154
Stating that, at best, J. McIntyre is applicable to cases in
analysis.”
which the facts are the same, the court cited the sale of 203 forklifts to
Mississippi customers over the previous decade as sufficient minimum
contacts to remove the case from “the scope of McIntyre’s applicabil155
ity,” and the motion for reconsideration was denied.
A second suit alleging similar facts, Lindsey v. Cargotec USA, Inc., was
156
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky.
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit follows Justice O’Connor’s
157
But, as in Ainsworth, because the Supreme
Asahi plurality opinion.
Court in J. McIntyre did not conclusively define the scope of the
stream-of-commerce theory, and because Justice Breyer chose to rely
on current Court precedent, the Lindsey court decided that J. McIntyre
158
had given it no cause to abandon Justice O’Connor’s standard.
However, on roughly the same facts regarding the relationship between
152

Id. at *5 (citing Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 470
(5th Cir. 2006)).
153
Id. at *7.
154
See id.; see also Garland v. Roy, 615 F.3d 391, 399 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that
in the Fifth Circuit, “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the
narrowest grounds.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
155
Ainsworth, 2011 WL 4443626, at *7.
156
Lindsey v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 09-00071, 2011 WL 4587583 (W.D. Ky. Sept.
30, 2011). The Kentucky Supreme Court recently ruled that Kentucky’s long-arm statute, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(2)(a) (Lexis Nexis 2008), is not coterminal with the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution and instead involves a two-step process. See
Hinners v. Robey, 336 S.W.3d 891, 895 (Ky. 2011) (“[T]he proper analysis of long-arm
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant consists of a two-step process under which
review first proceeds under [section] 454.210 and, if jurisdiction is permissible under
the long-arm statute, only then is jurisdiction under federal due process examined.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The court in Lindsey opted to skip the first step,
because, according to the court, an exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process
regardless of the analysis under the statute. Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *2. Although
the court skipped the first of the two steps, it seems as though the corporation would
be within the reach of the long-arm statute, given the facts of the case. See, e.g., Hinners, 336 S.W.3d at 896 (“A plain reading of the statutory language produces the
interpretation that . . . the contract provide for the supplying of services or goods
to be transported into, consumed or used in Kentucky.”).
157
See Lindsey, 2011 WL 4587583, at *4 (asserting that the Sixth Circuit does not
consider a defendant’s placement of a product into the stream of commerce sufficient
to constitute an act of purposeful direction).
158
Id. at *7.
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159

Moffett and Cargotec, the court determined that “[b]ecause Moffett’s distribution agreement with Cargotec to market and sell forklifts
to the national market is not conduct that targets any specific forum
State, . . . and in light of Moffett’s lack of control over the distribution,” Moffett showed no purposeful availment of Kentucky’s laws suf160
Thus the motion to
ficient to meet Justice O’Connor’s standard.
161
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was granted. These two cases involved the same manufacturer, the same distributor, the same
distribution agreement, the same defective forklift model, and the
same Supreme Court case, but resulted in opposite holdings. Where
is the fair play and substantial justice in that?
CONCLUSION
With Asahi, the Court inaugurated a period of great uncertainty in
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, and now, over twenty-five years
later, state and lower federal courts still find themselves in the dark.
Faced with obvious doctrinal confusion, and an opportunity to correct
the problem, the Court in J. McIntyre failed to clear the murky waters.
The damage to the reasonableness and fairness standard may be irreparable. If the Court’s reasoning in J. McIntyre holds, defendants
could, by having sufficiently few contacts with any single state, escape
jurisdiction in all states.
The Court in McGee spoke of the “increasing nationalization of
162
commerce” as the grounds for expanding the “permissible scope of
163
state jurisdiction.”
Nearly six decades after that decision, the increasingly global nature of commerce is undeniable. The Court recognized more than 50 years ago that concepts such as “‘consent,’
‘doing business,’ and ‘presence’” were poor standards for “measuring
164
the extent of state judicial power over [foreign] corporations.”
What was true in 1957 should be true in 2012; the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned in this case that, in light of our changing global economy, we must “discard outmoded constructs of jurisdiction” in
products liability cases like the one then before the court and choose

159

See id. at *7-12 (outlining the business arrangement between Moffett
and Cargotec).
160
Id. at *10 (quoting Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC, No. 08-5489, 2011
WL 3702423, at *12 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161
Id.
162
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
163
Id. at 222.
164
Id.
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a standard that will provide relief to those “harmed by the products
of a foreign manufacturer that knows or should know, through
thedistribution scheme it employs, that its wares might find
165
their way into our State.”
The Cargotec dichotomy shows that, whatever else the Court does,
it must at least choose a standard. Unless justice is different in
Mississippi than it is in Kentucky, the present mode is unsustainable.
Although this Note argues that the “traditional notions of fair play and
166
substantial justice” standard is the best standard, it is in the best interests of future litigants that the Court at least agree on a standard.
Whatever the personal jurisdiction standard may be, it must take into
account current business practice and the foreseeable needs of plaintiffs who seek redress in the courts of their home states.

Preferred Citation: Zach Vosseler, Case Note, A Throwback to Less
Enlightened Practices: J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 366 (2012), http://www.pennumbra.com/casenotes/52012/Vosseler.pdf.

165

Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 591 (N.J. 2010).
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
166

